By
Calvin W. Lew 15 March 2010 Race, racism, and ethnic prejudice
were not the primary factors, but definitely major factors in the outbreak and
conduct of the Fifteen Year War in Asia and the Pacific. The various geo-political causes for the
outbreak of the War have been widely examined in traditional studies since the
time of the War itself. In recent
decades, historical explorations have shown that race was a contributing factor
in creating a world atmosphere where the outbreak of war would occur. And, race was definitely a factor in the
conduct of the war itself, not just between Asians and the Euro-Americans, but
between the Asians themselves. Attitudes about race and ethnic
prejudice among the Euro-American powers helped to create the geo-political
climate that led to war. And, once that
war began and was unavoidable, these attitudes definitely shaped the
conflict. These prejudices were factors
in the conduct of the war from the Japanese viewpoint as well, in Japan’s
relations with its Asian neighbors, and its own colonial territories. Even the United States, the country that was
supposedly leading the way in the rhetoric of racial equality and individual
liberty, had racial views of Japan, Asians, and its own ethnic minorities at
home. The outbreak of the war had
historical factors dating back much further than the Mukden Incident of
September 18, 1931, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937, or the
Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941.
In the colonial era of empires, clear inequalities existed as the
Euro-American powers established spheres of influence, dictated trade policies,
colonized, or semi-colonized most of the nations in Asia including China,
Japan, India, and Southeast Asia. There
were racial inequalities not only on a nation-to-nation basis, but also on an
individual basis in the imperial colonies and within the supposedly sovereign
Asian nations regarding treatment of indigenous Asians and those of “pure
European descent” (Horne). Japan’s attempt to break from this
international system began and resulted from the time that it was first
“opened” to the West with the coming of Commodore Matthew C. Perry’s 黒船 kurobane
(“black ships”) sailing right into Edo Bay in July 1853. This triggered a series of events that
brought about an internal debate in Japan that resulted in the fall of the
Tokugawa Shogunate and the establishment of the Meiji Restoration (January 3,
1868) that modernized Japan (to avoid the same fate as her neighbor, China)
(Fujitani 1.6.10). From the time of the First Sino-Japanese
War (1894-1895), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), and the First World War,
Japan seemingly achieved racial equality on a nation-to-nation basis as it
emerged as a modern, military, imperial power in its own right. An Asian power defeated a “European” power on
land and sea, extraterritoriality in Japan was abolished, tariff autonomy was
regained, and Japan was part of the victorious Allies (Fujitani 1.11.10). Racial inequalities proved to still
exist in the world when the Allies showed that they were not quite ready for
Japan’s racial equality proposal at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. This was also evidenced by the relationship
between Asians and Euro-Americans throughout the empires and the world. Besides the Japanese, other Asians
experienced discrimination and differential treatment throughout the
Euro-American empires and territories.
Chinese experienced Chinese Exclusion laws in the United States and even
local Chinese were treated as lower-class citizens in their native Hong Kong
territory of the British Empire. Americans
condescendingly viewed Filipinos as “our little brown brothers” who had to be taken
care of. Even the Indians, long-time
subjects of the British Empire, or Eurasians with European blood were
mistreated because they were not of strict “pure European descent.” The racial and class situation in British
Hong Kong was analogous to apartheid South Africa, and the Jim Crow experiences
of African-Americans (Horne). During the pre-war, early-war, and in
some places even during the war periods, these racial attitudes about Asians in
the British Empire and other Euro-American empires helped to create sympathy
for Japan and her “cause.” In defeating
Russia, regaining its own sovereignty, achieving imperial equivalency with the
European powers, and asking for racial equality, Japan represented to other
Asian nations and people of color the world over that it was possible to come
out from the oppressive yoke of the European imperialists. The idea of Pan-Asianism developed where
Asians should be “united” against the unfair Europeans and that it should be
“Asia for the Asiatics.” During the
pre-war period, many prominent Chinese and other Asians from all over Asia went
to Japan to study. Japan was viewed as
the de facto leader of Asia that other Asian countries should emulate (Horne). Japan’s version of this concept was its大東亜共栄圏 Dai-tō-a Kyōeiken Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. At its creation initiated
by Prime Minister 近衞 文麿 Fumimaro Konoe, the propaganda mirrored the Pan-Asian ethos. But, promulgated by the military, it became
more of a propaganda tool defending Japan’s imperial intentions in China and
Manchukuo. From Japan’s view, their
actions and philosophies were justified.
Empire was the means of achieving world racial equality (Duus). Korea and Manchuria were viewed as “lines of
sovereignty” and “lines of advantage” as buffer zones against China and Russia,
especially after the experiences of the 1894-95 and 1904-05 wars (Fujitani
1.11.10). Pre-July 7, 1937 and
pre-December 7, 1941, Japan’s relations with her neighbors soured, especially
with China, but sympathies remained. Perhaps
Japan’s imperialist designs on Greater Asia were racially motivated. The Allies’ un-acceptance of racial equality
at Versailles showed that Japan was not quite equal. She did not have enough “might” to be
“right.” Although Japan pushed for
racial equality among Asians and non-Asians, she herself viewed other Asians as
her inferiors as evidenced by the Japanese treatment of Japan’s own ethnic
minorities, the Okinawans, the Taiwanese, Koreans, the Chinese at the Rape of
Nanjing, and the Filipinos. Post-1937
and 1941, it was clear that Japan’s own racial attitudes possibly contributed
to the war’s outbreak and definitely the war’s conduct. Despite the Japanese Empire’s cruelty, it is
interesting that post-Nanjing Massacre, the Chinese in Japanese-occupied
British Hong Kong may have sympathized with the
Japanese invaders rather than with their British overlords (Horne). In the conduct of the war between Japan
and its major antagonist the United States, race was definitely a factor. This has its roots in the relationship
between Japan and the United States before and leading up to Pearl Harbor. Because of the racist views of each other,
this caused mistrust, misunderstandings, and the eventual breakdown of
diplomacy. Before the American part of the war, the
American view of the Japanese in particular was blatantly prejudiced. There were Japanese exclusion laws,
particularly in the Western states, and the American view of the Axis powers
were not equal. The Germans were not
viewed as inherently evil and the dispute was an internal “family fight,” not a
conflict with an outside “other.” There
was no German equivalent of the “Yellow Peril,” the “Huns” war propaganda aside
(Dower 258-259). Those in Japan that have lived and studied
in America, like some diplomats and some members of the Japanese Imperial Navy,
better understood America and opposed any possible future conflict. But, the rest of the Army, military, and
government viewed Americans as lazy, complacent, and ambivalent. These attitudes had an effect on the factors
that led to a failure in diplomacy (Kase). Once “total war” began, the conflict,
its conduct, actions, and strategies were in large part driven by race. Japanese-Americans were suspected and censored
in Hawaii, and interned on the mainland while German-Americans were not. Even in films depicting the war, the Japanese
race as a whole was portrayed negatively, as in 1945’s “First Yank into
Tokyo.” Generally, in films and public
opinion, the German people were not evil, just the National Socialist German
Workers’ Party, the Nazis, and Hitler.
In images, Hitler was the personification of the evil of Germany while
the Japanese race itself was compared with rats to be exterminated or monkeys
(Cook, Dower). These attitudes may have affected
tactics in the conduct of the war itself.
While the United States condemned Britain for bombing the German city of
Dresden which had little military value, the U.S. firebombed civilians in Tokyo
at a stage so late in the war that it probably would not have affected the
outcome. Did the Americans place
differing values on the civilian lives of Japanese versus Germans? Japanese propaganda during the war that
American troops would “rape the women” and “run them over with tanks” affected
the actions of Japanese military and civilians in Saipan, Okinawa, and other
Pacific Islands (Miyagi, Kinji). Instead
of utilizing and trusting the civilians to fight the American enemy, the Army often
used brutal oppression and murder to attempt to control the local population
(Allen). And, the civilians, certain
that capture by the Americans would mean certain rape, death, and dishonor,
were “forced” to commit “mass suicides” (Miyagi, Kinji). This propaganda also exemplifies the
attitudes and relationship of Japan and its people to its colonial and minority
subjects in especially Korea and Okinawa.
There were racial and prejudicial policies of “differential inclusion”
which on principle proclaimed that Okinawans, Taiwanese, and Koreans were equal
subjects and citizens of Japan, but in practice, treatment and inclusion were
differential (Allen, Chou, Cook). During the total war, Japan had a labor
shortage and recruited or coerced Koreans to serve. In name, they were told they were equal
members of the Empire, but in practice they were treated as lesser members and
even enslaved. Kasayama Yoshikichi as a
Korean Guard resented his oppressive, Japanese overseers, but was equally cruel
to the captured prisoners (Kasayama). Ahn
Juretsu was forced to labor as a virtual slave on the airfields (Ahn). And, Shin Bok Su, a resident of Hiroshima was
denied war compensation because of her ethnicity (Shin). In Okinawa, Taiwan, and Korea, efforts
were made to prohibit or discourage the local language and require the learning
and usage of standard Japanese language.
In Okinawa, speaking Okinawan was punishable by death and efforts to
require Japanese language were less than completely successful in Taiwan and
Korea (Chou). The “Kominka Movements” to integrate
Taiwan and Korea into the Japanese Empire, society, and culture perhaps had
more practical motives rather than sincere acceptance of these peoples as racially
or politically “Japanese.” Although the
rhetoric and propaganda claimed them to be equal, loyal subjects of the
Emperor, these movements were perhaps attempts to control the colonial subjects
to better utilize them. Besides the
language, Taiwanese and Koreans were persuaded to convert to the Shinto
religion (with very little lasting success), change their names to Japanese
names (which often had roots in their original names), and serve in the
Japanese military in one capacity or another (Chou). Racial prejudice in military recruitment
may have potentially had the most impact in the conduct and outcome of the
war. Even those in Korea and Taiwan that
wanted to serve in the Japanese military had to prove their loyalty, “Japanese-ness,”
and pass strict loyalty and language requirements. And, even if accepted, they were relegated to
prison guards, transport, and other rear-guard duties. Conscription wasn’t even implemented in
Taiwan or Korea until 1944 and 1945 (Chou). This may have been a factor if one looks
at the Japanese labor and troop shortage during the war and the respective
populations of the countries. In 1940,
Japan proper had a population of about 73.1 million, Korea 24.3 million, and
Formosa (Taiwan) 5.7 million. If Japan
trusted its colonial subjects and treated them better (like perhaps the way the
British should have treated the Indians and Chinese in Hong Kong), this would
have signified a potential personnel increase of 41 percent. Whether this would have affected the ultimate
outcome is debatable, but it definitely could have been a factor (Horne). Because of the racism that existed in
both countries and empires before and during the war, this affected the change
in racial policies and attitudes in the United States. This was relevant in the relationship of the
United States to its minorities, especially African-Americans. Although slavery was abolished at the end of
the Civil War, Jim Crow laws and practices existed throughout the American
South. In oft-quoted anecdotes,
African-Americans were often treated better in Asia, Japan, Hong Kong, and Germany
than they were at home. Before the war,
African-Americans often sympathized with the Japanese and even thought that
Japanese and Africans could be of the same race. These attitudes were greatly due to their
treatment by the Whites in America (Horne). In the supposed “post-racial” world
where a Harvard-educated African-American can become the President of the
United States, a 二世 Nisei Japanese-American born on December
7, 1924 in Honolulu can become a United States Senator, and where
Arab-Americans and Muslims are viewed with suspicion, the subjects of race and
prejudice leading up to, during, and after the Fifteen Year Asia and Pacific
War are very relevant. Individual and
national decisions and geo-political realities of the era may have caused the
outbreak of the war, but racial attitudes and prejudices were major factors of
the conduct and outcome of the war.
Whether it is the treatment of British prisoners, Asians seeking
individual, political, and national equality, the sufferings of Asian subjects
of the Japanese Empire, and military tactics, race was a factor. These echoes of the past still resonate today
in Japan as a current debate rages on whether to allow a bill in the Diet to
grant tax-paying permanent foreign residents of Korean descent the right to
vote in local elections. Works
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Wan-you. “The Kominka Movement in Taiwan
and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations.”
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