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Review ?See No Evil is a compelling account
of America?s failed efforts to ?listen in? on the rest of the world,
especially the parts of it that intend to do us harm.? ?Wall Street Journal
?Robert Baer was considered perhaps the best on-the-ground field officer in the Middle East.? ?Seymour M. Hersh, The New Yorker
--This text refers to the
Paperback
edition.
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As a former clandestine case officer,
leaving the Agency in 1988 after unsuccessfully chasing terrorists for
a few years, I knew we were in bad shape but I did not realize just how
bad until I read this book. The author, working mostly in the Near East
(NE) Division of the Directorate of Operations, and then in the
Counter-Terrorism Center when it was just starting out, has an
extremely important story to tell and every American needs to pay
attention. Why? Because his account of how we have no assets useful
against terrorism is in contradiction to what the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) told the President and his top advisors at Camp
David on Saturday 15 September. According to the Washington Post of 31
January 2002, page A13, on the 15th the DCI laid out an ambitious
"Worldwide Attack Matrix" and told the President that the United States
had a "large asset base" from its years of working the terrorism
target. One of these two men one is closer to the truth than the other.
In my judgement, I believe Baer has three-quarters of the weight on his
side. This discrepancy warrants investigation, for no President can be
successful if he does not have accurate information about our actual
capabilities.
There are four other stories within this excellent
book, all dealing with infirm bureaucracies. At one level, the author's
accounting of how the Directorate of Operations has declined under the
last three leaders (as the author describes them: a recalled retiree,
an analyst, and a "political" (pal)) is both clearly based on ground
truth, and extremely troubling. The extraordinary detail on the decline
and fall of the clandestine service is one that every voter should be
thinking about, because it was the failure of the clandestine service,
as well as the counterintelligence service (the Federal Bureau of
Investigation) that allowed 9-11 to happen...at the same time, we must
note that it was a policy failure to not have investigated similar
incompetencies when a military barracks in Saudi Arabia, two Embassies,
and a naval destroyer were attacked, and it was clearly known in open
sources that bin Laden had declared war on America and had within
America numerous Islamic clerics calling for the murder of
Americans--all as documented in an excellent Public Broadcast Service
documentary.
At a technical level, the author provides some
really excellent real-world, real-war annecdotes about situations where
clandestine reporting from trusted operations officers has not been
accepted by their own superiors in the absence of technical
confirmation (imagery or signals). As he says, in the middle of a major
artillery battle and break-out of insurgent elements, screaming over
the secure phone, "its the middle of night here". We've all known since
at least the 1970's that the technical intelligence side of things has
been crushing human sensibility, both operational and analytical, but
this book really brings the problems into the public eye in a
compelling and useful manner.
At another level, the author uses
his own investigation for murder (he was completely cleared, it was a
set-up) by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and at one point by the
Secret Service, to shed new light on the complete break-down of
internal security processes within the CIA. At its lowest point, he is
pressured by DO management with a psychological evaluation to determine
his fitness for duty--shades of Stalinism! I know this technique, of
declaring officers unfit for duty based on psychological hatchet jobs,
to be a common practice over the past two decades, and when Britt
Snider was appointed Inspector General at CIA, I told him this was a
"smoking gun" in the 7th floor closet. That it remains a practice today
is grounds for evaluating the entire management culture at CIA.
There
is a fourth story in the book, a truly interesting account of how big
energy companies, their "ambassadors" serving as Presidential
appointees within the National Security Council, and corrupt foreign
elements, all come together. In this the spies are not central, so I
leave it as a sidenote.
In my capacity as a reviewer of most
intelligence-related books within these offerings, I want to make it
clear to potential buyers of this book that the author is not alone.
His is the best, most detailed, and most current accounting of the
decrepit dysfunctionality of the clandestine service (as I put it in my
own book's second edition), but I would refer the reader to two other
books in particular: David Corn's "Blond Ghost: Ted Shackley and the
CIA's Crusades"--its most memorable quote, on covert action in Laos,
being "We spent a lot of money and got a lot of people killed, and we
didn't get much for it."--and Evan Thomas' "The Very Best Men--Four Who
Dared: The Early Years of the CIA"--its best quote: "Patriotic, decent,
well-meaning, they were also uniquely unsuited to the grubby,
necessarily devious world of intelligence." There are many other books,
including twelve (12!) focused on reform and recommended by the Council
on Intelligence.
The author is a brave man--he was brave on the
fields of war and clandestinity, and he is braver still for having
brought this story to the public. We owe him a hearing.
I saw Robert Baer on CNN last night and he
said he thinks the CIA is improving. He says the agency has finally
realized it cannot carry out it's mission without field operatives. He
says, however, it will take five years to train agents to operate in
places like the Middle East. Apparenly, agents cannot get the hang of
things overnight. The gist of SEE NO EVIL is that for years, the agency
moved in the wrong direction--relying almost exclusively on technology
and less and less on human contact. Baer left the CIA in 1997 and was
working as a "consultant" last summer in Lebanon when he heard
something was afoot. It seems the folks in Washington preferred to look
the other way and see no evil--hence Sept. 11. Baer says on that
dreadful day, the FBI, CIA, INS, and plenty of others failed. A small
band of fellow citizens on a plane flying over PA saved Washington.
(The Pentagon is in South Arlington--and as it happens--a few blocks
from my house where I stood and watched black smoke rise into the sky.
Although the Pentagon was damaged, the damage would have been far worse
if the plane had crossed the river, because the Pentagon is constructed
of reinforced concrete. Experts think the plane that crashed in PA was
headed for DC. Two of my work colleagues were on that flight--Federal
workers.)
Since I work for a Federal agency, I can certainly identify
with some of the bureacratic struggles Mr. Baer experiences. However,
there are ways to get things done, and Mr. Baer himself shows how he
managed to do so on more than one occasion. First you have to give up
the idea of rapid advancement. Bureacracies don't reward risk-taking.
Baer skated on thin ice more than once because he made the decision
that he had to live with his own conscience. His his final citation
(awarded to him without his knowledge) says, "He repeatedly put himself
in personal danger, working the hardest targets, in service to his
country."
This is not poppycock. Plenty of career Feds take
their jobs very seriously and love the country as much as Mr. Baer.
Many have made sacrifices and been sacrificed, and not always for a
good cause. Many like Baer have become whistle blowers. Unfortunately,
whistle blowers are often seen as "bad" because they upset the status
quo and force all of us to face reality. In a land where indulgence and
fanasy entertainment rule, many people don't want to be reminded of
that evil is real.
Many of our elected officials and appointees
are narrowly focused on career advancement, shortsighted and care only
about what happens during their watch, and can hardly contain
themselves as they prepare for the next election, the next big job, the
next salary increase. But don't throw the baby out with the bath water,
there are good guys in Washington. Some of them are elected officials
like John McCain and John Kerry. Some are appointed like Donald
Rumsfield. Many are career civil servents like Mr. Baer.
Robert
Baer's book reads like a John LeCarre thriller and I enjoyed it so much
I had to slap myself in the face and say, you dummy, this is the real
thing, THIS IS NOT FICTION. These guys really get killed--like Michael
Spann. I hope the CIA uses the book as part of its recruitment package.
The sad fact is that the U.S. has been wounded over and over and
failed to act to stop terrorism. When you add up all the insults and
injuries as Baer has done the truth is overwhelming: the hostages, the
murders and assainations, the capture and/or destruction of U.S. and
other embassies, the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon, Black Hawk down,
the military quarters in Yemen, the U.S.S. Cole, the airline crashes
and hijackings, and hundreds of other incidents including the Sept. 11
disasters. Our so-called leaders have been asleep at the switch--too
interested in partying and/or shagging an intern in the cloak room.
Alcohol, drugs, and illicit sex are a problem in Washington DC.
But
worst of all is sheer incompetance. As Baer puts it, each
administration handed the problem along to the next without really
addressing it--the not on my watch syndrome. Clinton seems to have been
especially concerned with donations to his campaign war chest than to
doing the job he was elected to do. Baer says the Bush Sr. and Reagan
administrations could have done more too. Unfortunately, the latter was
too concerned with the Cold War to notice the hot war. All of them were
not up to the job--yet they were elected, some of them more than once.
And don't think BIG OIL arrived with the current President Bush. One
can trace the tracks of BIG OIL and big business back to JFK. Ike
warned U.S. citizens of the miltary industrial complex--it's other name
is oil.
Baer says we are at war, and the war will be difficult
to win. The ignorant have already taken to the streets to protest. But
what is the alternative? In 1971, I was thrown out of a military
commisary for wearing pants--I know I would not survive a Muslim regime.
Started out a little slow, he gets pretty
detailed about some obscure middle east players, which I wasn't
terribly interested in. Toward the middle it picked up and got more
interesting. Overall it was a good read. At the end he tied his work in
the CIA with the things going on in the middle east currently, which I
found very eye-opening. Also gave a good, candid perspective of the
current state of the CIA, as well as some insight into a career as a
CIA case officer.
Bob Baer has written an outstanding account
of his training and experience as a case officer in CIA's clandestine
service. He provides excellent insight into a shadowy world few
Americans understand or appreciate. Baer is a hero akin to the old
school OSS-bred Directorate of Operations officers. His account of the
careerism and political correctness of the new CIA is disheartening.
The lack of testicular fortitude among the new generation of
intelligence officers is, I am afraid, not limited to CIA. I saw it
first-hand in another agency before my retirement after 35 years in
intelligence.
It is interesting to compare "See No Evil" to Lindsay Moran's
"Blowing My Cover, My Life as a CIA Spy." Moran's book has some value
because of its updated information on how CIA case officers are trained
at "The Farm" in rural Virginia. However, her account of her
short-lived and less than heroic service as a field officer is in sharp
contrast to Baer's service and contributions. Moran is the embodiment
of what Baer sees as having gone wrong with the DO and with the Agency
as a whole. She clearly does not understand what a case officer should
be. Baer got it right. He deserves a salute and another medal just for
writing "See No Evil." Attaboy, Bob!
Like most readers, I picked this up based on
the plug I got from Syriana. For those expecting a rendition of the
movie, "Sleeping with the Devil" by the same author is closer, but even
then, it misses the point. The book provides an eye opener to both the
mundane and important aspects of clandestine operations, and points out
where we are grossly failing in the War on Terror. (Or is it extremism
nowadays?) When much of the failure in this War is due to a lack of
understanding at the top, it is worth a view from the bottom.
Like many books in the genre, the facts are unverifiable, but the
ideas and themes can be double checked. Many are right, some not. The
book helps point the way for us to find for ourselves.
I
listened to the CDs, read by the author. It was pretty good but the
author's failure to get details right made me question whether he
really knew what he was talking about, or if he had really done the
things he claimed to have done. For example, he refers to the "PUK" as
the "Popular Union of Kurdistan" several times. Everyone knows that the
P stands for Patriotic, not Popular. If he really was in northern Iraq,
the author would know this. Not saying it's not worth the time, just
that I question the accuracy of some of what's there.
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